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An Empirical Assessment of Early Offer
Reform for Medical Malpractice
Joni Hersch, Jeffrey O'Connell, and W. Kip Viscusi

ABSTRACT
The early offer reform proposal for medical malpractice provides an option for claimants to
receive prompt payment of all their net economic Losses and reasonable attorney fees. Using
a Large sample of closed individual medical malpractice claims from Texas supplemented by
data from Florida, this article provides an empirical assessment of the consequences of the
early offer reform. Noneconomic damages make up about two-thirds of paid claim amounts.
The minimum payment amount for serious injuries will affect the magnitude of insurer savings
and claimant compensation. Payments to claimants will be expedited by 2 years by the early
offer reform, and Litigation costs will be reduced by an average of $100,000-$200,000 per
claim.

1. INTRODUCTION

Medical malpractice litigation has long been a target of tort reform
efforts.' Much of the stimulus for these reforms arises because insurers
JONI HERSCH is Professor of Law and Economics at Vanderbilt University Law School.
JEFFREY O'CONNELL is Samuel H. McCoy II Professor of Law at University of Virginia
Law School. W. KIP VISCUSI is University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and
Management at Vanderbilt University Law School. We thank participants at the University
of Chicago conference Current Research in Medical Malpractice Liability for helpful comments. This research was supported by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
contract HHS-100-03-0009 with the Lewin Group. The authors are solely responsible for
the contents of this article. Any policy views expressed are those of the authors and do
not represent the views of either the Lewin Group or the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services.
1. For a brief critique of current medical malpractice law, see O'Connell and Boutros
(2002). Hyman and Silver (2005) and Baker (2005) respond to criticisms of medical malpractice law but nonetheless propose substantial reforms. One of Hyman and Silver's
[Journalof Legal Studies, vol. 36 (June 2007)]
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and defendants in these cases are subject to substantial costs that are
often uncertain. Similarly, claimants who have suffered medical injuries
face uncertainty regarding payment for their injuries as well as delays
in receiving payment. Medical malpractice reforms to date have not
attempted to revamp the underlying structure of the claims process but
instead have focused more narrowly on ways to limit liability and the
level of awards. A typical legislative reform has been the imposition of
limits on the level of noneconomic damages.
This article focuses on a quite different reform approach known as
the early offer reform.' In broad outlines, the insurer has the option of
making a prompt early offer of net economic damages and attorney fees.
If the claimant turns down the early offer, he or she can pursue a tort
claim, but the legal standard of proof will be raised to gross negligence.
The early offer approach consequently is in the spirit of both workers'
compensation and no-fault auto insurance in that it attempts to reduce
transactions costs, expedite payments, and address the accident victim's
economic losses.
The rationale for the early offer approach can be conceptualized in
terms of the optimal insurance compensation structure that patients
would choose at an earlier preinjury point in time. Suppose patients do
not know in advance that they will suffer a medical injury but can assess
the probabilities of the possible outcomes. How would patients structure
the medical malpractice compensation system if they had to pay the full
actuarial cost of this medical malpractice insurance? If patients in our
thought experiment were paying the insurance costs and structuring their
own insurance, they would fully insure their economic losses but would
not purchase coverage for pain-and-suffering damages. 3 Consistent with
this optimal insurance approach, the early offer reform addresses only
suggested reforms is a variant of early offers as a way to diminish exposure to pain-andsuffering damages.
2. O'Connell (1976), O'Connell and Pohl (1997-98), O'Connell and Boutros (2002),
and O'Connell, Kidd, and Stephenson (2005) provide background discussion and a more
detailed presentation of the early offer reform concept. For an economic model of the cost
and other effects of the early offer proposal, and for illustrative examples showing similar
results, see O'Connell, Kidd, and Stephenson (2005). The model especially highlights the
wedge effect that current law induces in placing a barrier between claimants and defendants
that early offers greatly diminish (O'Connell, Kidd, and Stephenson 2005, pp. 280-97).
See especially O'Connell, Kidd, and Stephenson (2005, figure 2) compared with their figure
6 and their discussions of these figures.
3. For a review of the evidence on pain-and-suffering compensation, see Viscusi (1996).
In brief, it will not be optimal to insure pain-and-suffering damages if the injury reduces
one's marginal utility of income.
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economic losses. Current tort reform efforts such as caps on pain and
suffering likewise limit the noneconomic damages component, but unless
there is a provision for attorney fees as in the early offer reform, these
caps may lead to situations in which claimants are not fully compensated
for their economic damages. 4
Damages payments in theory serve a deterrence objective. Cost savings for the insurer imply lower tort costs for physicians guilty of malpractice as well as lower medical malpractice insurance costs and thereby
may reduce any existing deterrence effect.' Most empirical evidence examines only the effect of medical malpractice in encouraging defensive
medicine.6 There is little compelling statistical evidence that on balance
medical malpractice enhances patient health, so it is not possible to assess
the lost deterrence value.
This article does not address normative questions related to early
offer reform. Rather, we provide an empirical examination to assess the
consequences of early offers: who gains, who loses, how the timing of
payments is affected, and the effect on litigation costs.
The analysis is made possible by the use of data on individual closed
medical malpractice claims from Texas (State of Texas 1988-2002),
which we supplement with a comparable medical malpractice data set
from Florida (State of Florida 1974-2002). Together, these data provide
a basis for assessing how claims that are paid under the existing medical
malpractice regime will fare under an early offer reform.
Section 2 describes the functioning of the early offer reform in detail
and also examines how we implement the empirical analysis to capture
the implications of this structure. In Section 3, we develop the operational components of the early offer reform. Many of the empirical issues
considered are of independent interest, including the noneconomic damages share of awards, the role of collateral source payments, and the
level of litigation costs incurred by defendants in medical malpractice
cases. Section 4 examines the implications of different variants of the
early offer reform. In Section 5, we present the conclusions from our
assessment.
4. For example, if the contingency fee share is one-third and economic damages are
75 percent of the award, there will be an 8 percent shortfall in covering economic losses
if there is no payment for noneconomic damages.
5. The increased promptness of payments under the early offer reform will in part
bolster the incentive effect of damages payments by raising their discounted present value.

6. See Kessler and McClellan (2002) for a study of the effect of malpractice claims on
defensive medicine. Kessler and Rubinfeld (2004) review this evidence in detail.
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2. THE EARLY OFFER REFORM

The early offer reform gives defendants the option of making an early
offer that will expedite payment of claimants' economic losses.7 Under
the early offer reform for medical malpractice claims, within 180 days
after a claim is filed, liability insurers for health care providers, who
hereafter will be referred to as insurers and providers, respectively, may
offer claimants a payment equal to the claimant's net economic loss
(that is, the loss beyond any other insurance applicable to the claim)
plus reasonable legal fees. If the claimant does not accept this offer, the
injured victim can proceed with a normal tort claim for both economic
and noneconomic damages. However, the legal standards of both the
burden of proof and level of misconduct applied to the claim would be
raised, and the claimant would have to prove gross negligence beyond
a reasonable doubt. If the insurer does not make an offer, the current
tort regime would apply.
Insurers would decide whether to make an early offer by comparing
the cost of the early offer to their expected cost under normal tort rules
if the claim were not settled under the early offer reform. This expected
cost would equal the net economic damages (medical expenses and wage
loss but not noneconomic damages) plus attorney fees, which as an
illustrative calculation in this article are presumed to be 10 percent of
the value of the early offer. Let c be the expected liability and litigation
costs if the claim is not settled under the early offer approach. For any
given claim, the value of c is the same as that under the current tort
regime. Let c' be the portion of the litigation costs already incurred before
making an early offer. Let d be the value of the claimant's economic
damages, and let s be the value of the collateral source payments received
by the claimant. The insurer will make an offer if
c - c'> 1.1(d - s).

(1)

Note that the costs c' incurred by the insurer have been netted out of
the cost figure because they will not affect whether it will be desirable
to make an early offer. These costs have already been incurred as part
of the claim evaluation process and are sunk costs that are not pertinent
to the subsequent decision of whether to make an early offer.
7. This theoretical model differs in several key ways from the Department of Health
and Human Services (DHHS) early offer pilot program, which attempts on a voluntary
basis to promptly resolve claims that have been submitted to DHHS for alleged medical
malpractice by its employees or at DHHS-sponsored community health centers.
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The analysis below also considers two variants of this basic early
offer reform. First, we consider the effect of a minimum payment m for
a particular class of injuries. Requiring a minimum payment amount
converts the criterion for an early offer to be desirable to the condition
that
c - c'> 1.1 max [d - s, m].

(2)

Thus, the claimant is ensured the maximum of either d - s or m. An
overall minimum payment amount provides a floor regarding coverage
of economic losses that may come into play in situations in which the
claimant does not have substantial economic losses.
The second set of variants of the early offer reform does not provide
for a deduction for collateral source payments. With this approach, if
there is no minimum payment amount, the early offer will be made if
c - c'> 1.1d,

(3)

and if there is a minimum payment amount, the insurer will make an
early offer if
c - c'> 1.1 max[d, m].

(4)

Note that if there is no deduction for collateral sources and the minimum
payment amount m is high, claimants will be able to receive more than
100 percent coverage of their economic losses as well as specific compensation for attorney fees.
Each of these four inequalities assumes that insurers act in a rational
economic manner. The insurer will make an early offer when the insurer's
expected exposure from a full-scale tort claim is greater than the amount
of the early offer. Note that this formulation assumes that insurers are
risk neutral, which is likely to be the case since any given claim involves
a small amount of costs relative to the size of the entire portfolio of
policies.
In the analysis below, we present calculations of the amounts that
insurers would save by making early offers, since such savings are a
prerequisite to making early offers. But savings to insurers do not necessarily imply losses to claimants of an identical magnitude. Consider
for example the early offer reform variant given by inequality (1). Assume that the insurer finds making an early offer attractive. From the
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vantage point of the time at which the early offer is made, the savings
to the insurer will be given by
Insurer savings = c - c' - 1.1(d - s)

(5)

if we also include the costs c' incurred by the insurer to evaluate the
claim initially.
Suppose that under the existing tort regime claimants receive noneconomic damages n and that claimants-will pay one-third of their award
as a contingency fee payment to their attorneys. Then the net gain to
claimants under the early offer reform, where this amount may be negative, is given by
Claimant gain = (d - s) - .67(d + n)

(6)

Claimant gain = .33d - s - .67n.

(7)

or

Claimants gain under the early offer reform if the one-third deduction
from economic loss for attorney fees under the current tort regime is
greater than the value of collateral source payments plus two-thirds of
the noneconomic damages value. Insurers will always benefit if they
choose to make an early offer.'
Some of the savings for both parties are in terms of lowered transactions costs, as attorney fees will be reduced by the early offer reform.
If insurers make an early offer, claimants lose their normal recourse to
full-blown tort litigation. Because claimants are risk averse, the value
of the claim under the current tort regime is less than its expected monetary value. 9 The losses claimants currently experience due to uncertainty
will not be calculated, but we take into account how early offers reduce
delays before payment and also reduce transactions costs.
This article uses Texas and Florida medical malpractice data on closed
individual claims to assess the performance of the early offer reform.1 °
The core of the analysis is the Texas database because it is more comprehensive, but we also use the Florida data to impute data not included
8. With perfect foresight, the expected costs c for the insurer will equal d + n plus the
insurer's litigation costs. However, after making this substitution in the equations, it can
be shown that insurer savings will not generally equal claimant losses.
9. Empirical evidence documenting substantial claimant risk aversion for productrelated claims appears in Viscusi (1988b).

10. Specifically, we use the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) Commercial Liability
Insurance Closed Claim Reports (State of Texas 1988-2002) and the Florida Medical
Professional Liability Closed Claims database (State of Florida 1974-2006).
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or with incomplete information in the Texas files. The Texas data are
from the time period 1988-2002, before Texas modified its medical
malpractice law in 2003 by, among other things, limiting noneconomic
damages to $500,000.
The next section describes the calculation of the components of the
early offer reform. The Texas data permit us to calculate three different
measures of the expected liability cost and litigation cost of the claim
c. The first measure is the insurer's initial reserve amount to pay the
claim, which insurers calculate at the start of the claims process. The
second measure is the final reserve amount, which is calculated at a later
stage of the claims process. The third measure is the actual settlement
or award plus the amount of litigation costs incurred by the insurer. The
Texas data also provide a basis for calculating the economic damages
amount d, and, in conjunction with the Florida medical malpractice data,
it is possible to calculate collateral source payments s and noneconomic
damages n. Our calculations focus on the amount of the settlement or
award paid and do not distinguish whether the amount was due to
settlement, trial, or appellate decision.
Based on this information, we calculate both the number of cases for
which an early offer is attractive and the average insurer savings if an
early offer were in fact made and accepted. We perform the calculations
by analyzing the data in two ways: by injury type, for example, fatality
or serious nonfatal injury; and by type of damages, for example, whether
exemplary damages were reported, whether only noneconomic damages
were reported, and whether both noneconomic and economic, but not
exemplary, damages were reported, which is the more typical situation.
The empirical assessment also examines alternative assumptions regarding a minimum payment amount m to include the effect of $100,000,
$250,000, or $500,000 minimum payment amounts for fatalities and
serious nonfatal injuries and the effect of including offsetting collateral
sources s in determining net economic damages as part of the early offer.
We also calculate how much time is saved if an early offer is made and
accepted for each of these alternative specifications. In addition, we
examine the effect on litigation cost savings, which consist mostly of
attorney fees for both claimants and insurers.
Because the Texas data set includes only claims that are paid, we
cannot analyze the effect of the early offer reform on the universe of
cases. 1 Lawyers may file some claims not currently brought by searching
11. Dewees, Duff, and Trebilcock (1996, p. 425) indicate that 60 percent of medical
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for cases that are not economically viable under the present tort regime.
If there is a behavioral response leading to more claims or claims with
higher economic losses compared with current claims levels, the estimates based on current claims data will serve as an upper bound of the
cost savings.
Several factors limit the extent of the overstatement of cost savings.
First, the early offer reform restricts claimant attorney fees to a reasonable amount, such as 10 percent, which is below the more typical onethird contingency fee rate. Many cases not currently compensated will
not be attractive to attorneys under an early offer approach because
attorney fees are limited. Second, if it were easy for claimants to allege
gross negligence or to boost the value of their damages claim in a credible
manner to elicit an early offer, they would already have the incentive to
do so under the current system. Third, most of the scenarios for emerging
new claims involve claims with smaller losses, as there is already a strong
incentive to bring claims for very serious injuries involving large losses.
If the big stakes claims that will be filed are already in the data set, that
will limit the extent to which our estimates overstate cost savings.
Fourth, because the insurer can always choose not to make an early
offer, it can revert to the existing tort regime and its associated payoff
structure for claimants.
There also may be a response by juries that will reduce the cost savings
under the early offer reform. Note that under the early offer reform,
fewer claims will be decided by juries, so the magnitude of jury offsetting
behavior is limited. Sharkey (2005) hypothesizes that juries respond to
noneconomic damages caps by raising the award for economic damages.
Sharkey analyzes medical malpractice cases reported in the waves of the
Civil Justice Survey of State Courts and finds no significant effect of a
noneconomic damages cap on the total level of compensation. However,
this result does not imply that there is no effect of such caps or that
there is offsetting jury behavior. The imposition of a noneconomic damages cap will induce a case selection effect whereby the cases filed will
have a greater share and a greater level of economic damages than before
the imposition of a cap. Thus, one will observe an apparent increase in
the role of economic damages and a different case mix even without an
offsetting jury response.
malpractice claims are closed without payment. The economic model in O'Connell, Kidd,
and Stephenson (2005, p. 295) indicates that more claims will be paid under an early offer
regime but "the increase . . .will be too small to offset the savings."
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If, however, there is any such offsetting behavior, it is not a complete
offset. noneconomic damages caps substantially reduce medical malpractice insurance losses, as shown by Viscusi and Born's (2005) analysis
of a comprehensive data set consisting of all U.S. medical malpractice
insurers by firm, by state, and by year. 2 This result does not exclude
the possibility that there will be some partly offsetting behavior that
emerges once noneconomic damages are excluded from payment for
typical claims filed under the early offer reform, but it does indicate that
insurers' losses will decline significantly.

3. COMPONENTS OF THE EARLY OFFER REFORM

3.1. Expected Overal Insurers' Costs
The maximum amount c that an insurer would be willing to offer to
resolve a claim under the early offer reform is determined by the insurer's
expected liability and litigation costs of proceeding with the claim under
normal tort law. This expectation takes into account the probability of
settling the claim or losing the case at trial. These probabilities are incorporated in the reserve amounts, which are our first two measures of
c. The actual claim cost is restricted to claims for which there was
payment, so that the payment or settlement amount calculations for the
third measure of c are not weighted by any probabilities. Because insurers
get to decide whether to make an early offer, we focus on their decision.
As indicated above, in our calculations we use three different reference measurements to estimate the basis for that decision: the insurer's
initial reserve amount, the insurer's final reserve amount, and the actual
amount of the settlement or court award for the claim plus associated
legal defense expenses. The use of the second or third measure to decide
on the feasibility of an early offer assumes greater foresight on the part
of the insurer than is the case with the initial reserve amount. However,
if the early offer reform is enacted, one would expect insurers to refine
their initial reserve estimates by obtaining additional information about
the merits of the claim and the net economic damages. The Texas closed
claim data used here report the initial and final reserves divided into
indemnity reserve (that is, the reserve for payments) and expense reserve
12. The noneconomic damages variable's negative and significant effect on medical
malpractice insurer losses appears in the regression results in table 4 of Viscusi and Born

(2005).
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(that is, the reserve for all claim-related defense expenses). The expensereserve information allows us to calculate the savings in expected legal
defense expenses on the basis of the reserve amounts. We also calculate
the savings on the basis of actual legal defense costs incurred for the
claim because the Texas data set separately reports both total allocated
loss adjustment expenses and allocated legal and administrative expenses
assigned to a given case.
Our analysis considers a broad range of medical malpractice claims.
Texas requires that insurers submit information on claims with bodily
injury payments of at least $10,000. Payments over $25,000 are reported
on a long form, and payments of $10,000-$25,000 are reported on a
short form.13 The years for which Texas data are currently publicly
available are 1988-2003. We use data for the years 1988-2002, before
Texas modified its medical malpractice law in 2003. We use supplemental
data from Florida, which has two medical malpractice closed claim data
sets: the archival data set from 1975 to mid-July 1999 and the current
data set from mid-July 1999 to 2003. Until 1997, Florida insurers reported all closed claims, even those with zero payment. After that time,
insurers reported claims with a nonzero payout, although there continued to be some voluntary reporting of zero claims.14
The primary insurer, which is the principal insurer in a case, submits
the Texas closed claim forms to the Texas Department of Insurance
(TDI). The primary insurer reports its reserve based on its expected
payment and also reports information on its actual payment and what
any other insurers of defendant parties contributed to the settlement or
award. This means that the reported reserve corresponds to the portion
of the claim the primary insurer expects to pay, while the total settlement
or court award pertains to the actual full payment of the claim.
If it is desirable to make an early offer collectively on behalf of all
the insurers involved in any given case, each individual insurer should
usually find making an early offer attractive, and therefore insurers will
join together in making an early offer. Otherwise, any nonofferer will
face a claimant now seeking noneconomic damages and economic dam13. Reported information on reserve amounts and defense litigation expenses is not
available in any other data set that reports medical malpractice claims, such as the Florida
medical malpractice data set analyzed by Vidmar et al. (2005).
14. Note that throughout the article, all dollar values are adjusted to 2002 dollars
using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers. Tables Al, A2, and A3 provide
selected descriptive characteristics of the Texas closed claim sample, including information
on the distribution of total settlements or court awards.
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ages with no collateral source offset."s Assuming then that the early offer
will be a collective venture among the applicable insurers, the pertinent
reserve values to determine the willingness to pay for the early offer are
the projected amounts for all insurers, not simply that for the primary
insurer. To obtain this projection, we scale up the primary insurer reserve
amount by the size of the total settlement or award, divided by the
payment by the primary insurer plus any deductible.
3.2. Defense Legal Expense
Not all of the defense legal expenses will be saved if an early offer is
accepted because some costs, given by c' above, must be incurred to
evaluate the claim before deciding whether to make an early offer. To
assess the share of costs that would be saved, we adopt an approach
that is consistent with the early offer reform's projected treatment of a
claimant's legal fees. Assuming that the usual claimant's attorney fee
would be one-third of any normal tort settlement or award, the presumed
early offer reform attorney fee of 10 percent of net economic loss provides payment of 10/33 of the otherwise normal contingency fee as a
part of the early offer. 6 Making a parallel share assumption for insurers,
we assume that the fraction 10/33 of defense legal expenses will be
incurred before the early offer is accepted. If the insurer chooses instead
to litigate the claim, it will incur this 10/33 fraction of defense costs
plus the remaining 23/33 fraction. Thus, by settling a claim on the basis
of an early offer, the insurer saves the 23/33 fraction of legal expenses.
As with reserves, we scale up the primary insurer defense costs.
In our calculation of whether an early offer is desirable, the maximum
an insurer would be willing to offer is the expected tort settlement or
award plus this 23/33 defense costs share. If the early offer is accepted,
the only defense costs that count as insurer savings are the 23/33 share
amount because, as indicated, the other defense costs will already have
been incurred.
3.3. Net Economic Loss
Of the 16,437 claims in the Texas data set, 5,733 reported a breakdown
of the damages into four possible categories: (1) economic damages,
15. For purposes of the empirical analysis, we assume that the insurers can be treated
as a collective entity and that in practice any disputes over division of costs among insurers
will be handled later through arbitration.
16. Our analysis will not consider different percentage amounts, but the choice of the
claimant attorney fee percentage is a key parameter that will be negotiated as part of any
early offer reform legislation.
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which, net of collateral sources, are payable under an early offer,
(2) noneconomic damages, which are not payable under an early offer,
(3) exemplary damages, which indicate cases for which an early offer
would more likely be declined, and (4) prejudgment interest, which will
be largely eliminated because of the promptness of early offer payments.17 For cases in which the breakdown of economic damages is
included in the Texas data, we use that damages amount. For all other
cases, we use the average economic damages share calculated using the
Florida medical malpractice data. In particular, we distinguish four different economic damages share values based on injury type (fatal or
nonfatal) and age (under age 18 or 18 and over). The economic damages
shares of the total award are as follows: .359, nonfatal, under age 18;
.156, nonfatal, age 18 and over; .345, fatal, under age 18; and .246,
fatal, age 18 and over. Because age and injury type are not reported for
the TDI short form claims, we use the same economic share of .348 for
all short form claims which is calculated as the weighted average of the
economic damages share for all nonfatal claims.18
The large noneconomic damages share of the total award accounts
for most of the large insurer cost savings under the early offer reform
and is of independent interest in its own right. These noneconomic damages amounts, which are chiefly for pain and suffering, greatly exceed
the comparable values for product liability cases, which range from .26
for paraplegia or quadriplegia to a high of .54 for cancer (see Viscusi
1988a, p. 207).
Because the focus of the early offer plan is to compensate for economic loss, and because the Florida data do not report either exemplary
(punitive) damages or prejudgment interest as separate categories, we
also do not provide imputed noneconomic damages, exemplary damages,
or prejudgment interest. To provide more information on the allocation
of damages into the four categories, we report detailed information on
the distribution of economic damages, noneconomic damages, exem17. The actual breakdown is reported for court awards and is an estimate as contemplated in the settlement for those without court decisions. Per TDI staff, for cases that
settled out of court, the breakdown is asked to be reported only if, in the opinion of the
individual completing the form, the settlement was influenced by a demand or possible
award of noneconomic damages, exemplary damages, or prejudgment interest. Also per
TDI staff, this is the best and only information available using Texas closed claim data on
the components of damages awards, as most insurers do not record information with even
this level of detail.
18. The indemnity cap is $25,000 for short form closed claim reports, so the injuries
are unlikely to entail fatality or serious nonfatal injury.
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Table 1. Distribution of Damages for Claims in Which Breakdown Is Reported (N = 5,733)

10th percentile
25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile
90th percentile
Mean
Standard deviation

Economic
Damages
($)

Noneconomic
Damages
($)

Exemplary
Damages
($)

Prejudgment
Interest
I$)

Total
Settlement or
Court Award
1$)

0
10,000
33,021
121,390
396,256
181,330
613,140

15,237
39,626
112,087
323,950
800,000
344,875
777,297

0
0
0
0
0
41,579
330,858

0
0
0
0
34,711
24,533
146,451

33,626
72,095
203,162
544,052
1,325,772
592,316
1,336,522

plary damages, prejudgment interest, and the total settlement court
award in Table 1 for the 5,733 claims in which a breakdown is reported.
Although the TDI long form allows reports of whether any collateral
sources were available to the injured party, claimants are not required
to report such sources to the insurer. Investigation of these data suggests
that reports of collateral sources were incomplete. 9 We therefore impute
the percentage of economic loss offset by collateral sources under early
offer reform using the Florida medical malpractice data, which provide
more complete information on collateral sources. For claims with positive economic loss in the Florida data, we calculate the share of economic loss that will be offset by collateral sources as the sum of the
percent of total recovery from the following insurance categories: health,
disability, workers' compensation, automobile,2" and Medicare. We then
translate this percentage into a dollar value based on the total economic
loss. The average percent collateral offset for the different classes of
cases is then calculated as the average dollar value of collateral offset
divided by the total economic loss, calculated for each of the four age
and fatality categories used to impute economic loss. The specific collateral source fractions of economic loss are as follows: .249, nonfatal,
under age 18; .281, nonfatal, age 18 and over; .213, fatal, under age
18; and .199, fatal, age 18 and over. Because age and injury type are
not reported for the TDI short form claims, we use the same collateral
19. While 40 percent of the claims reported on the long form indicate at least one
payment by a collateral source, the estimated collateral source offset using the share of
economic loss offset by collateral sources in the Texas data yields an estimate of only 4.8
percent. This value is far below the collateral source share calculated directly from the
Florida data, which is a more reasonable 25 percent as described in the text.
20. Although the Florida data documentation does not state this explicitly, we assume
the "automobile" category is limited to first-party automobile coverage such as no-fault
or medical pay coverage.
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source offset for all short form claims of .264, calculated as the average

for all nonfatal claims.21
3.4. ExempLary Damages

Claimants who do not accept an early offer must show that the provider's
conduct was grossly negligent, which is variously but similarly defined
in several states, in order to collect full tort damages. A useful measure
of whether claimants would anticipate that this higher legal standard
could be met, and therefore opt out of the early offer settlement and
choose instead to litigate, is whether exemplary damages in the tort
settlement or court award are reported to the TDI. In the case of settlement, reported exemplary damages were those estimated as part of
the settlement rather than awarded by the court. For purposes of our
analysis, we assume that all claims in which there are such reports of
exemplary damages will opt out of the early offer and that all claims
without exemplary damages will be in a position to accept an early offer
if one is made.
On the basis of these assumptions, we distinguish claims that report
exemplary damages from those that do not, and we indicate the results
under the early offer reform with and without these claims. As the breakdown in damages categories in Table 2 indicates, only 521 of the 16,437
claims involve exemplary damages. In practice, some claimants who
ultimately might have received exemplary damages may choose to accept
the early offer, since there is substantial uncertainty as to whether such
damages will be awarded. Likewise, some claimants who ultimately will
not receive exemplary damages will choose to reject the early offer because they overestimate their chances of receiving such damages.
3.5. Minimum Payment for Fatalities or Serious Nonfatal Injuries

Another feature in the reform arises from the treatment of serious tort
claims in which economic damages would be small, although noneconomic losses would be substantial. Fatalities to children and older people
with no or low levels of earnings would, for example, tend to produce
few economic damages, although the nonpecuniary costs to the survivors
would, of course, be large. As a result, we explore two alternative ap21. These collateral source share estimates may be low in that they are based on reports
by insurers rather than on reports by claimants, who would be expected to have more
knowledge of such payments. However, the estimated level of collateral source payments
is not too dissimilar from the 30-40 percent estimate obtained by Danzon (1985) using
California medical malpractice data.
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proaches to treating serious claims, which we define as fatalities, amputations, brain injuries, and spinal cord injuries. These are the claim
categories in the TDI data with the largest amounts of noneconomic
damages. First, we consider the effect of basing the early offer decision
on actual net economic damages incurred, and second, we consider the
effect of setting a floor of $250,000, or alternatively of $100,000 or
$500,000, as the minimum amount of damages payable in such serious
cases.

4. THE CONSEQUENCES OF EARLY OFFER REFORM

4.1. Reserve Amounts and Awards
Table 2 reports insurers' initial and final reserve, the total settlement or
court award, and claimants' economic loss. The multiplication factor
used for the results by damages category is described in Section 3.1; it
scales up the reserve amount to reflect total payments by multiple parties.
In Table 2 and the subsequent tables, the results by damages category
stratify the sample into four groups to show how different types of claims
in the TDI data are handled by the early offer reform. It is important
to remember that only about one-third of the claims report a breakdown
of damages into the four possible categories of damages: economic damages, noneconomic damages, exemplary damages, and prejudgment interest. For these claims not reporting the allocation of damages into
these four categories, we impute economic damages using the method
discussed in Section 3.3. For those claims that do report the breakdown
into the four categories of damages, one group is composed of claims
with exemplary damages as well as other damages. 2 The next group is
composed of claims for which neither exemplary damages nor economic
damages were reported. For these claims, all damages amounts paid by
the insurer were noneconomic and/or prejudgment interest. Thus, under
an early offer reform that pays economic damages only, claimants with
zero economic damages would receive zero payments. We analyze these
claims separately because, first, these claims will be most affected by a
22. Of the 16,437 claims in the data set, only 25 reported exemplary damages as part
of a court award. Most of the court awards were subsequently reduced. The value we use
for the total settlement or court award is the final payment, not the original court award,
and whether a claim is included in the row "Exemplary damages reported" is based on
whether exemplary damages are reported in the breakdown of the actual settlement or
award not on whether the original court award included exemplary damages.
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minimum-payment requirement in the early offer reform and, second,
without a minimum payment, such claimants gain nothing from the early
offer and will have the most incentive to pursue litigation. The final
group is composed of claims with positive economic loss reported. Such
claims typically also report noneconomic loss and/or prejudgment interest.
Several patterns are noteworthy. The cases with exemplary damages
have the highest values for every reserve or loss value in the table. The
other entries tend to be more similar in terms of reserve and award
values, with the largest amounts being for cases for which positive economic damages are reported. The projected initial reserves for all categories are below the total settlement or court awards, which in turn
are smaller than the projected final reserves. But one thing to note is
that the reserve amounts in Table 2 include defense expense reserves,
which are mainly legal expenses, in addition to indemnity reserves,
whereas the settlement or court award values do not take such expenses
into account. (These expenses are considered in Table 3.)
It may be puzzling that the initial reserves are so much lower than
the final reserves, but there are several possible explanations for this
difference. The fact that initial reserves are well below final reserves does
not necessarily imply that insurers are underreserving on average with
their initial reserve amounts, although that may well be the case, as
indicated in the scholarly literature. 23 The initial reserve amount serves
as a placeholder until the insurer researches the claim in detail. The cases
observed in the data set are the successful claims that led to insurer
payouts. If, for example, the insurer reserves the same amount for claims
of a particular type, with this amount corresponding to the average claim
costs, then the claims that are ultimately successful will be underreserved
initially, while the unsuccessful claims will be overreserved. Thus, the
selection of claims for inclusion in the data set alone could account for
the observed pattern without any bias in the reserving practices. As the
claims mature, insurers learn to distinguish which claims in this overall
claims category are those with the highest expected losses, which leads
the final reserve amount to exceed the initial reserve value for claims
that are paid.
Table 2 also reports information by nature of injury, excluding claims
23. That there may be systematic errors in loss reserving is well documented. Weak
insurers have a tendency to underreserve to make their financial soundness appear brighter
(see Petroni 1992). In addition, the amount of reported reserves may be affected by incomesmoothing objectives and tax concerns (see Gaver and Paterson 1999; Grace 1990).
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reporting exemplary damages because, as indicated, we assume such
claims will most likely lead to claimants' opting out of an early offer.
Information on the nature of injury is reported on the Texas long form
and enables us to distinguish fatalities and serious nonfatal injuries (brain
damage, spinal cord injury, and amputation) from other nonfatal injuries. Overall, 47 percent of the cases for which the injury type is given
are either fatalities or serious nonfatal injuries (see the Appendix). The
Texas short form does not record the nature of the injury. Because claims
reported on the short form represent damages payments under $25,000,
it is probable that these claims do not represent cases with a fatality or
other serious nonfatal injury, and so these claims are grouped with nonfatal, nonserious injuries in the table.
In terms of empirical magnitudes, the serious nonfatal injuries in
Table 2 involve the largest reserve amounts and settlement or award
amounts. Indeed, this is the only category for which the average settlement or court award is above $1 million. The average economic loss
for this category remains substantial but is well under $500,000.
4.2. Earty Offer Outcomes
Whether insurers will choose to make an early offer and how much they
will save relative to the current medical malpractice regime depends on
the maximum amounts that they would be willing to offer under the
present tort regime minus the amounts that they would have to pay
under the early offer regime. We refer to these amounts as the insurer
savings stemming from the early offer plan, meaning that compared with
the current system, the early offer reform will save insurers these
amounts. Table 3 reports insurer savings calculated from different assumptions about the insurer's expected costs: projected initial indemnity
(that is, damages) reserve, projected final indemnity reserve, and actual
total settlement or court award. In calculating economic loss plus legal
fees, we assume that the early offer plan sets the claimant's attorney
fees at 10 percent of the value of the tendered economic loss. Thus, the
attorney fee payment is in addition to economic loss rather than being
deducted from the loss payment as is done under the current tort regime.
Table 3 reports the average insurer savings when they are positive or
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zero based on the following calculations. Savings based on initial reserve
are given by
Insurer savings = Projected(initial indemnity reserve
+ 23/33 x initial expense reserve)
-

1.1 x economic loss.

Savings based on final reserve are given by
Insurer savings = Projected(final indemnity reserve
+ 23/33 x final expense reserve)
- 1.1 x economic loss.

Savings based on total settlement or court award are given by
Insurer savings = Total settlement or court award
+ 23/33 x total allocated loss adjustment expenses
-

1.1 x economic loss.

We also calculate these insurer savings based on the assumption of a
minimum payment of $100,000, $250,000, or $500,000 for fatalities
and serious nonfatal injuries.
Interestingly, the imposition of the minimum payment increases the
average savings per case. That seemingly paradoxical result can be traced
to the change in the mix of claims for which an early offer is desirable.
As the minimum payment amount is increased, it is desirable for insurers
to make an early offer for fewer claims. Once a $250,000 or even a
$100,000 minimum is imposed, it is only the very high stakes claims
for which the insurer will find an early offer attractive. Raising the
payment minimum consequently reduces the number of claims in which
an early offer will be made but increases the average savings for this
altered mix of cases. The savings are high because the mix of remaining
claims have a high level of noneconomic damages, Which are not compensated under the early offer reform.24
Repeating this analysis deducting imputed collateral sources from
economic loss indicates that, naturally enough, the early offer reform
will be attractive to insurers more often when collateral sources are offset
from economic loss. But although collateral sources offset about 25
24. The same phenomenon applies to the effect of minimum payments on claimant
losses recorded in Table 5.
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percent of economic loss, the effects are generally similar to those reported in Table 3, with the largest increase in savings occurring when
insurers are basing the attractiveness of the claim on final reserves.2"
4.3. Expedited Payments
Table 4 reports time saved by the early offer reform under the assumption
that offers will be made and accepted in 180 days. The early offer reform
will expedite payments by about 2 years overall and by about 2.5 years
for serious nonfatal injuries.
4.4. Litigation Cost Savings
Because the early offer reform expedites the claims process and limits
attorney fees, the main quantifiable gain from the early offer reform is
the savings in litigation costs. 26 These litigation cost savings are reported
in Table 5. As discussed in Section 3.2, for insurers we estimate the
litigation cost savings based on the fraction 23/33 of the reserve for legal
expenses or actual legal expenses, depending on whether the calculations
are based on reserves or actual expenditures. The initial reserve for legal
expenses does not account for the fact that incurring these expenses will
not be immediate. We convert these estimates to a present value (PV)
assuming a 3 percent interest rate and a time period equal to the timeperiod savings under the early offer reform. For the other litigation cost
estimates, we assume that no discounting is needed. In all cases, for
claimants we estimate the litigation cost savings as .23 of what the total
settlement or award would have been in the absence of the early offer
reform.
The specific equations used to calculate litigation cost savings reported in Table 5 are as follows. When the early offer decision is based
on the initial reserve,
Litigation cost savings = .23 x Total settlement or court award
+ PV(23/33 x initial expense reserve).
When the early offer decision is based on the final reserve,
Litigation cost savings = .23 x Total settlement or court award
+ 23/33 x final expense reserve.
25. An appendix with these results is available on request.
26. There are other gains that are more difficult to assess, such as the benefit of reducedpayment uncertainty.
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When the early offer decision is based on total settlement or court award,
Litigation cost savings = .23 x Total settlement or court award
+ 23/33 x attorney fees.
As the estimates in Table 5 indicate, the litigation cost savings are
substantial, as these average savings are over $100,000 per claim for
every category except for one of the estimates based on the initial reserve
amount. As the analogous distribution by injury type indicates, the cases
for which the litigation cost savings are under $100,000 are the nonserious, nonfatal injuries and short form claims. Even this category for
less serious claims has average litigation cost savings ranging from
$50,085 to $108,737.
4.5. Gains or Losses to Claimants
The effect of different early offer reform structures on different categories
of claims can be assessed as well. Under the current tort system, we
assume that claimants receive two-thirds of the total settlement or award,
with the remaining one-third going to attorney fees. The early offer plan
compensates claimants for net economic damages, which are paid earlier,
thus increasing their discounted present value.27
Table 6 indicates the effect of early offers on claimants in terms of
the average net gain or loss in dollars paid. Estimates for the percentage
of claimants in each group who will gain from the early offer approach
account for contingency fee shares under the current tort regime. Consider the effect on all claims. The percentage of claimants who gain in
dollar payout is 4 percent or less, with an average loss of
$134,601-$161,663, but the results by injury type indicate that the
imposition of a minimum payment amount can substantially increase
the percentage of claimants who benefit. The percentage of cases involving a fatal injury that would receive a higher net payment amount
under the early offer reform is as high as 45 percent for a $250,000
minimum and 59 percent for a $500,000 minimum.
5.

CONCLUSION

This article analyzes the empirical implications of the early offer reform
of medical malpractice liability insurance.2" This approach would reduce
27. We use a 3 percent interest rate as in Section 4.4.
28. The early offer reform analyzed here could be applied more narrowly or more
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insurer costs, provide payments of claimants' economic losses, expedite
the timing of payments, and lower transactions costs. The magnitude of
these effects is highly dependent on the structure of the early offer reform, especially the different minimum payments ranging from $100,000
to $500,000 for fatalities and serious nonfatal injuries. These minimum
payment amounts influence the net gains or losses of the parties, with
these effects varying by injury type.
Because noneconomic damages make up about two-thirds of current
medical malpractice settlements and awards, insurers usually reap
greater net financial benefits than do claimants. Except when there is a
minimum payment amount, most but not all claimants will suffer a loss
in expected payoff amounts. However, these calculations do not account
for the risk premium claimants would be willing to pay for compensation
that avoids the uncertainties of the current tort system. Seriously injured
patients also may benefit in expected value terms if there is a high minimum payment amount. All early offer payees will benefit from the
increased promptness of payments. On average they will receive compensation 2 years earlier than they would under the current tort system.
For all injury categories and all the variants referred to above, there are
also savings in both overall insurer costs and litigation costs averaging
$100,000-$200,000 per case. Such savings in turn should substantially
reduce medical malpractice insurance premiums in the long run."'

broadly than to medical malpractice claims, for example, to only natal or surgical cases
or to all personal injury claims.
29. For documentation of the effect of medical malpractice losses on premiums, see,
among others, Born and Viscusi (1998).
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APPENDIX

Table Al. Selected Sample Characteristics of the Texas Department of Insurance Commercial
Liability Insurance Closed Claim Reports: Medical Malpractice
N

%

Long form
Short form
Total number of claims
Damages components reported
Exemplary damages reported

14,563
1,874
16,437
5,733
521

88.60
11.40
100.00
34.88
3.17

Primary insurer payment = total settlement or court award
Primary insurer payment + deductible = total settlement or
court award
Multiparty claim
Duplicate report within same year

10,283

62.56

10,810
9,418
926

65.77
57.30
5.63

Table A2. Age and Injury Characteristics: Long Form Claims

All

Fatality
Serious nonfatal injury
Under age 18
Age 18 or older

Serious
Nonfatal
Injury

Fatality

N

%

N

%

N

%

4,826
2,034
3,024
11,539

33.14
13.97
20.76
79.24

862
3,964

17.86
82.14

1,126
908

55.36
44.64

Table A3. Distribution of Total
Settlements or Court Awards

$10,000-$100,000
$100,001-$500,000
$500,001-$1,000,000
$1,000,001-$5,000,000
$5,000,000 and over

37.90
40.52
11.26
9.28
1.04
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